Abstract-Foreclosure laws govern the rights of borrowers and lenders when borrowers default on mortgages. In states with laws favoring the borrower, the supply of mortgage credit may decrease because lenders face higher costs. To examine the laws' effects, I compare approved mortgage applications in census tracts that border each other but are located in different states. Using a regression-discontinuity design and semiparametric estimation methods, I find that loan sizes are 3% to 7% smaller in defaulter-friendly states; this result suggests that defaulter-friendly laws impose material costs on borrowers at the time of loan origination.
I. Introduction
State foreclosure laws balance the rights of lenders and borrowers when borrowers default on mortgages. Some states attempt to protect borrowers who have fallen upon hard times by providing extensive protections to defaulters. These protections, however, can impose substantial costs upon lenders. If lenders attempt to recoup these costs by increasing interest rates or requiring larger down payments, laws intended to protect homeowners in distress may impose costs on all borrowers.
In this paper, I examine the effect of foreclosure laws on the size of approved mortgage loans. This effect is, a priori, ambiguous because foreclosure laws may have offsetting effects on mortgage supply and demand. As mentioned above, the supply of mortgage credit may be lower in defaulter-friendly states because lenders experience higher costs. However, defaulter-friendly laws provide borrowers with wealth insurance against falling house prices. If borrowers value this insurance, mortgage demand may be higher.
Identifying the effect of foreclosure laws on the mortgage market is difficult because both the laws and the factors that affect the mortgage market vary by region. The northeastern and midwestern states, for example, are more likely to require the judicial foreclosure process examined in this paper. Factors that affect housing and mortgage supply and demand, such as weather, fertile soil, and proximity to amenities, also vary across the country, and real estate downturns generally affect some regions more than others. In a simple cross-section regression, then, a regional shock to a given housing market could be misinterpreted as an effect of foreclosure law. Although previous authors have established a connection between foreclosure laws and the supply of mortgage credit, no study has taken regional patterns into account. 1 I address this identification problem by comparing approved mortgage applications in census tracts that border each other but are located in different states. Mortgages in these census tracts are subject to different laws, but because of their proximity may take on similar values for important unobserved variables. Analogous borders identification strategies were used by Holmes (1998) to estimate the effect of state right-to-work laws on the location of manufacturing, and by Black (1999) to explore the effect of school quality on house prices.
I implement the borders strategy with a fixed-effects model and a partial linear model. The fixed-effects model assumes that unobserved variables are constant across a given urban area. The partial linear model lets unobserved variables take on a different value for each census tract and requires only that these variables change smoothly over space. This semiparametric estimator fits within the regression discontinuity framework of Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Porter (2002) and is a useful tool for estimating the effects of state policies while controlling flexibly for spatially varying unobserved factors. Taking account of these unobserved variables proves to be important for my results.
II. Judicial Foreclosure Requirement
In 21 states, lenders must go through the courts to foreclose on a property. This judicial foreclosure process takes 5 months longer on average than the nonjudicial alternative (Wood, 1997) and imposes more transaction costs. Several studies have verified that the judicial requirement can significantly raise lender foreclosure costs, 2 perhaps by as much as 10% of the loan balance. 3 From the borrower's perspective, this requirement provides several months of free rent and protection against lender excesses.
Even when lenders pursue alternatives to foreclosure, foreclosure laws may affect the outcome. Lenders may be more willing to grant concessions to defaulters in states where pursuing a foreclosure is expensive. Foreclosure laws may also affect lender behavior even when most of the foreclosure cost is borne by private mortgage insurance companies or secondary market institutions such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The incentives of lenders and these institutions are aligned because their interactions are a repeated game: insurers, for example, may refuse loans from lenders with particularly costly loss histories.
III. Estimation
Identifying the effect of a judicial foreclosure requirement is difficult if the law is correlated with unobserved variables. Some studies of other state laws have controlled for these variables by pooling multiple years of data and estimating state fixed-effects models. These analyses assume substantial and exogenous variation in the state laws over time. This assumption is not valid for judicial requirements: states rarely change their laws, and the few changes that occur are generally in response to a mortgage market crisis.
Instead of relying on changes over time, I identify the effect of judicial foreclosure requirements from changes over space. I first select 55 urban areas that span state lines. By then examining variation within these cross-state urban areas, I can control for unobserved variables that vary with location while identifying the effect of the state laws from the change at the state boundary. This identification strategy, as noted earlier, is appealing because both judicial requirements and important factors that affect housing supply and demand follow spatial patterns. Figure 1 shows the 21 judicial foreclosure states and the 55 urban areas in the sample.
I use both a fixed-effects and a partial linear model. The fixed-effects model lets the intercept vary with each urban area in the sample and assumes that unobserved variables are constant across each urban area. If y is the log of the loan size, ␣ i is the urban area fixed effect, J is a dummy variable indicating the state requires a judicial process, and X contains other relevant covariates, this model can be written as
In the partial linear model, the intercept is a smooth function that takes on a different value for each census tract ct; thus unobserved values can also take on different values at each tract. These tracts, as defined by the Census Bureau, are small geographic areas intended to contain 4,000 people; they do not span state or county lines. This model is written as
Whereas the fixed-effects model compares each loan application with every application within its urban area, the more flexible partial linear model compares loan applications only with those of neighbors within a few miles.
Identifying the effect of a judicial requirement requires that ␣(ct) be a smooth function and E(ε͉X, ct) ϭ 0. Because the laws change discontinuously at the state border, ␣(ct) is only separately identified if it changes smoothly over space. A census tract fixed-effects model, in contrast, cannot be identified, because the census tracts are collinear with state laws. That E(ε͉X, ct) ϭ 0 implies that the specification allows for factors that change discontinuously at the state border and are correlated with judicial foreclosure requirements and loan size.
I estimate the partial linear model using the method outlined in Robinson (1988) . Robinson suggests taking the expectation of each term with respect to the nonlinear covariate, which here is the census tract location, 
E͑ y͉ct͒ ϭ E͑␣͑ct͉͒ct͒ ϩ E͑ J͉ct͒␥ ϩ E͑X͉ct͒␤,
and then subtracting the expected value for each variable from its actual value, thus eliminating ␣(ct):
After differencing these terms, ␥ and ␤ can be estimated with ordinary least squares.
I estimate the expected values with Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression, in which the expected value of a variable in a given census tract is just the weighted average of that variable in the surrounding tracts. The kernel governs how much weight is given to each of the surrounding census tracts; farther-away tracts receive less weight. The bandwidth, which is measured as the distance between tracts in miles, governs how many tracts are included in the average.
The choice of kernel usually has little effect on the estimates, whereas the choice of bandwidth can be important. To examine the robustness of the results, I experiment with two different kernels and with multiple bandwidths. One set of bandwidths is based on crossvalidation, which indicates that the optimal bandwidth for the judicial foreclosure variable is 9 miles. 4 In robustness tests I impose small variants of this bandwidth on all variables as well as experiment with giving each variable its optimal bandwidth. A second set of bandwidths is based on population density: unobserved variables may change more rapidly in densely populated areas than in sparsely populated areas. Because census tracts are designed to contain a roughly constant number of residents, the population-density bandwidths are based on the area of the census tract in square miles:
2 .
The average bandwidth under this approach is 6.5 miles, and the median is 4.3 miles. One advantage of the Robinson estimator is that ␤ converges at a ͌ n rate even though ␣ converges at the semiparametric rate. Standard errors can be estimated using the conventional ordinary least squares formula. Porter (2002) shows, however, that in a regressiondiscontinuity context ␤ converges at a slower rate and the conventional standard error formula cannot be relied on. As a result, I bootstrap the standard errors.
IV. Data
The analysis is based on urban areas that span state lines. An urban area in my sample is a group of contiguous counties that all touch a state border and are defined as "metropolitan" by the Census Bureau. These urban areas may not correspond to Census Bureau definitions of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), for two reasons. First, I only include counties along state lines. Second, the counties in an urban area do not necessarily have to be from the same Census Bureau MSA: one urban area, for example, is the easternmost county from the Mobile, Alabama, MSA, and the westernmost county from the Pensacola, Florida, MSA.
These selection criteria yield 55 urban areas that span state lines. In 28 of these areas, at least one state requires a judicial foreclosure process and at least one does not. Although the other urban areas in the sample do not help identify the effect of a judicial requirement directly, they help identify the effects of other state laws and policies that change at the border and may be correlated with a judicial requirement. 5 The assumption that unobserved variables are constant or change smoothly within an urban area may seem more plausible in some areas than others. Two such situations are noted here. First, the Census Bureau defines MSAs as areas with high degrees of social and economic integration. Thus, unobserved variables may be less comparable within the 20 urban areas that span more than one MSA. Second, in 23 urban areas, the entire state border coincides with a river. If a river is a barrier to interaction, houses on opposite sides of the river may have different unobserved characteristics. 6 In robustness tests, I examine whether these sample selection decisions affect the results.
I base the estimates on a data set of mortgage applications collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Under this federal law, mortgage lending institutions with assets above a certain threshold are required to report basic information on every mortgage application that they receive. This information includes characteristics of the applicant (income, race, sex, presence of coapplicant); characteristics of the loan (size, type, purpose, whether the property is owner-occupied); the census tract in which the property is located; and whether the application was approved. Regulators use these data to determine whether lenders are meeting the credit needs of their communities and complying with fair lending laws.
The sample consists of 1,252,562 approved applications for loans in 1994 and 1995 in metropolitan counties along state borders. Of these applications, 776,588 are in states that require judicial procedures. In constructing the sample, I include only applications for the purchase of owner-occupied, one-to four-family homes. I exclude loans originated by manufactured housing lenders, loans of less than $10,000, loans with missing or invalid census tract identifiers, and loans in which the borrower claimed to have no income.
To identify the effect of a judicial foreclosure requirement, I must control for other factors that affect loan size, are correlated with judicial foreclosure, and change discontinuously at the state boundary. For example, the characteristics of state residents or the housing stock may change at the border. To control for this possibility, I merge census-tract-level data from the 1990 Census with each loan application. These Census variables are the age, education, race, income, and employment status of the tract residents; the percentages of homes that are owner-occupied, rented, mobile, vacant, or have a given number of bedrooms; the median home value, property age, and rent; and the predicted crime rate for the tract, as estimated by CAP Index.
I also control for an assortment of county-and state-level laws and policies that affect housing supply and demand. The county-level variables are per pupil school spending, property taxes per capita, home building permits per capita, and banks per capita. The state-level variables are the state maximum income tax rate and the bankruptcy laws, as proxied by the logs of the personal property and homestead exemptions. In studies also based on HMDA data, Lin and White (2001) and Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) found that bankruptcy exemptions did and did not affect, respectively, whether a mortgage application was approved.
Finally, I add dummy variables for two other foreclosure-related laws-whether a state permits a statutory right of redemption or a deficiency judgment. A statutory right of redemption lets the borrower redeem the property for the foreclosure sale price for a period of time after the foreclosure. A deficiency judgment can be collected against the borrower's other assets if the lender's foreclosure costs exceed the foreclosure sale proceeds. I do not emphasize these variables in this paper because the existing literature suggests that they are less important and because there is not enough geographic variation to estimate their effects reliably with this paper's methodology. Pence (2003) provides more discussion. Table 1 shows estimates of the effect of a judicial foreclosure requirement on loan size; estimates of other parameters are shown in Table 2 . 7 To assess the importance of controlling for unobserved variables that vary with location, I compare the fixed-effects and partial linear regression estimates with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. The OLS model has the same set of control variables as the other models, but acknowledges location only through heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors that allow for clustering within urban areas. Standard errors in the fixed-effects model are also estimated with this formula.
V. Results
The results suggest that loan sizes are smaller in judicial foreclosure states and that controlling for unobserved factors is important. In the OLS estimates, loan sizes are a statistically insignificant 0.6% smaller in judicial states. Controlling for unobserved variables that vary with location, however, suggests a stronger and statistically significant relationship: loan sizes are 3.5% smaller in the fixed-effects model and 6.8% smaller in the partial linear model. The partial linear estimate may be larger because the model controls better for unobserved variables: each census tract is compared with its neighbors rather than with the entire urban area.
Similarly, restricting the sample to areas where unobserved variables are more likely to take on comparable values on both sides of the border increases the absolute size of the coefficient. In the fixedeffects model, dropping urban areas that comprise more than one MSA increases the judicial estimate to Ϫ5.4%; dropping urban areas where the state border coincides with a river increases the estimate to Ϫ5.0%. In addition, every urban area may contain an idiosyncrasy that makes the two sides of the border fundamentally different. To guard against this possibility, I run the fixed-effects model 98 times, dropping in turn the 55 urban areas and the 43 states in the sample. The judicial estimate ranges from Ϫ3.0% to Ϫ4.6% in the leave-outone-urban-area test, and from Ϫ2.5% to Ϫ4.7% in the leave-out-onestate test; it is always statistically significant.
The judicial parameter in the partial linear model is also robust to changes in the kernel and bandwidth. The choice of kernel has almost no effect: the point estimate is Ϫ6.7% in the Epanechnikov kernel/10-milebandwidth model and Ϫ6.8% in the corresponding triangular-kernel model. The choice of bandwidth has a larger effect: the estimates based on cross-validation bandwidths range from Ϫ6.7% to Ϫ8.5% whereas the estimates based on population-density bandwidths cluster around Ϫ5.3%. These estimates are all statistically significant.
Following Lin and White (2001) and Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) , I examine whether applications from borrowers in judicial states are more likely to be rejected, by repeating the analysis with an indicator for "application denied" as the dependent variable. The estimates suggests that borrowers in judicial foreclosure states are one-quarter percentage point less likely to be rejected for a loan (t-statistic: 0.65). This economically and statistically insignificant result is not necessarily inconsistent with the loan size results if borrowers discuss their application with loan officers or friends before submitting it. For example, a borrower in a judicial foreclosure state may learn that her application is more likely to be accepted if she increases the size of her down payment. If she follows this advice, she will have a smaller loan size than an equivalent borrower in a nonjudicial state, but an equal probability of acceptance.
VI. Discussion
After controlling for unobserved variables that vary over space, I estimate that loan sizes are 3% to 7% smaller in states that require judicial foreclosure processes. Three factors may contribute to this result. First, lenders may respond to the higher costs in these states by reducing the supply of credit. Second, house prices may be lower: if borrowers have difficulty securing mortgage credit, they may not be willing to pay as much for a house. Third, borrowers with a characteristic correlated with loan size may move to judicial foreclosure states.
Smaller loan sizes must reflect a reduced supply of credit, for there is no reason otherwise for house prices to fall or borrowers to sort into judicial states. Loan sizes could be smaller either because lenders require larger down payments or because borrowers respond to higher interest rates by requesting smaller loans. The estimate may also reflect lower house prices if the census tract housing characteristics included in the analysis, such as median house price, are not adequate proxies for individual property values.
7 See Pence (2003) for means and standard deviations of variables. Note. The dependent variable in the regression is log(loan size). Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors that allow for clustering within urban areas are shown in parentheses for the ordinary least squares and fixed-effects specifications. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 replicates are shown for the partial linear regressions. The optimal bandwidth for the judicial parameter, as determined by crossvalidation, is 9 miles. The 10-and 8-mile bandwidths impose small permutations of this optimal bandwidth on all variables, whereas every variable gets its optimal bandwidth in the cross-validation specification. Area is the census tract area in square miles. MSA ϭ metropolitan statistical area. Note. The dependent variable is log(loan size). Percentage variables take on values from 0 to 100. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors that allow for clustering within urban areas are shown for the fixed-effects specification; bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 replicates are shown for the partial linear specification. Partial linear estimates are based on a bandwidth of 10 miles and a triangular kernel.
Several sorting scenarios could also affect the estimate. For example, risk-averse households may move to judicial foreclosure states because they value the implicit insurance; these households may also be savers who put down large down payments. Alternatively, borrowers who plan to default on their loans and exploit the judicial protections may move to these states. If lenders cannot identify these households, they may tighten loan terms to compensate for the higher expected losses. These scenarios may not be important empirically, however, if the sorting variables are correlated with control variables in the analysis, or if factors such as proximity to a job, local income tax rates, or school spending matter more than foreclosure laws in the household location decision.
Although it is not possible to give the loan size coefficient a clean interpretation, it seems clear that the mortgage market reaches a different equilibrium in judicial foreclosure states. In these states, borrowers may pay more for their mortgages, purchase smaller houses, or have difficulty becoming homeowners. But borrowers are not necessarily worse off: they may value the insurance provided by the laws. Homeownership might even increase if the judicial protections help borrowers remain in their homes. Although judicial requirements seem to impose costs on borrowers, a full welfare assessment will also require estimates of the law's benefits.
